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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are one
of the most harmful threats in today’s Internet, disrupting the
availability of essential services. The challenge of DDoS detection
is the combination of attack approaches coupled with the volume
of live traffic to be analysed. In this paper, we present a practical,
lightweight deep learning DDoS detection system called LUCID,
which exploits the properties of Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) to classify traffic flows as either malicious or benign.
We make four main contributions; (1) an innovative application
of a CNN to detect DDoS traffic with low processing overhead,
(2) a dataset-agnostic preprocessing mechanism to produce traffic
observations for online attack detection, (3) an activation analysis
to explain LUCID’s DDoS classification, and (4) an empirical
validation of the solution on a resource-constrained hardware
platform. Using the latest datasets, LUCID matches existing state-
of-the-art detection accuracy whilst presenting a 40x reduction
in processing time, as compared to the state-of-the-art. With
our evaluation results, we prove that the proposed approach
is suitable for effective DDoS detection in resource-constrained
operational environments.
Index Terms—Distributed Denial of Service, Deep Learning,
Convolutional Neural Networks, Edge Computing
I. INTRODUCTION
DDoS attacks are one of the most harmful threats in today’s
Internet, disrupting the availability of essential services in
production systems and everyday life. Although DDoS attacks
have been known to the network research community since the
early 1980s, our network defences against these attacks still
prove inadequate.
In late 2016, the attack on the Domain Name Server (DNS)
provider, Dyn, provided a worrying demonstration of the
potential disruption from targeted DDoS attacks [1]. This
particular attack leveraged a botnet (Mirai) of unsecured IoT
(Internet of Things) devices affecting more than 60 services.
At the time, this was the largest DDoS attack recorded, at
600 Gbps. This was exceeded in February 2018 with a major
DDoS attack towards Github [2]. At its peak, the victim saw
incoming traffic at a rate of 1.3 Tbps. The attackers leveraged
a vulnerability present in memcached, a popular database
caching tool. In this case, an amplification attack was executed
using a spoofed source IP address (the victim IP address).
If globally implemented, BCP38 “Network Ingress Filtering”
[3] could mitigate such an attack by blocking packets with
spoofed IP addresses from progressing through the network.
However, these two examples illustrate that scale rather than
sophistication enables the DDoS to succeed.
In recent years, DDoS attacks have become more difficult
to detect due to the many combinations of attack approaches.
For example, multi-vector attacks where an attacker uses a
combination of multiple protocols for the DDoS are common.
In order to combat the diversity of attack techniques, more
nuanced and more robust defence techniques are required.
Traditional signature-based intrusion detection systems cannot
react to new attacks. Existing statistical anomaly-based de-
tection systems are constrained by the requirement to define
thresholds for detection. Network Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (NIDSs) using machine learning techniques are being
explored to address the limitations of existing solutions. In
this category, deep learning (DL) systems have been shown to
be very effective in discriminating DDoS traffic from benign
traffic by deriving high-level feature representations of the
traffic from low-level, granular features of packets [4], [5].
However, many existing DL-based approaches described in
the scientific literature are too resource-intensive from the
training perspective, and lack the pragmatism for real-world
deployment. Specifically, current solutions are not designed for
online attack detection within the constraints of a live network
where detection algorithms must process traffic flows that can
be split across multiple capture time windows.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), a specific DL
technique, have grown in popularity in recent times leading
to major innovations in computer vision [6]–[8] and Natural
Language Processing [9], as well as various niche areas such
as protein binding prediction [10], [11], machine vibration
analysis [12] and medical signal processing [13]. Whilst their
use is still under-researched in cybersecurity generally, the
application of CNNs has advanced the state-of-the-art in
certain specific scenarios such as malware detection [14]–[17],
code analysis [18], network traffic analysis [4], [19]–[21] and
intrusion detection in industrial control systems [22]. These
successes, combined with the benefits of CNN with respect
to reduced feature engineering and high detection accuracy,
motivate us to employ CNNs in our work.
While large CNN architectures have been proven to provide
state-of-the-art detection rates, less attention has been given to
minimise their size while maintaining competent performance
in limited resource environments. As observed with the Dyn
attack and the Mirai botnet, the opportunity for launching
DDoS attacks from unsecured IoT devices is increasing as
we deploy more IoT devices on our networks. This leads to
consideration of the placement of the defence mechanism.
Mitigation of attacks such as the Mirai and Memcached
examples include the use of high-powered appliances with the
capacity to absorb volumetric DDoS attacks. These appliances
are located locally at the enterprise or in the Cloud. With the
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2drive towards edge computing to improve service provision, it
becomes relevant to consider the ability to both protect against
attacks closer to the edge and on resource-constrained devices.
Indeed, even without resource restrictions, it is valuable to
minimize resource usage for maximum system output.
Combining the requirements for advanced DDoS detection
with the capability of deployment on resource-constrained
devices, this paper makes the following contributions:
• A DL-based DDoS detection architecture suitable for
online resource-constrained environments, which lever-
ages CNNs to learn the behaviour of DDoS and benign
traffic flows with both low processing overhead and attack
detection time. We call our model LUCID (Lightweight,
Usable CNN in DDoS Detection).
• A dataset-agnostic preprocessing mechanism that pro-
duces traffic observations consistent with those collected
in existing online systems, where the detection algorithms
must cope with segments of traffic flows collected over
pre-defined time windows.
• A kernel activation analysis to interpret and explain to
which features LUCID attaches importance when making
a DDoS classification.
• An empirical validation of LUCID on a resource-
constrained hardware platform to demonstrate the appli-
cability of the approach in edge computing scenarios,
where devices possess limited computing capabilities.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec.
II reviews and discusses the related work. Sec. III details the
methodology with respect to the network traffic processing
and the LUCID CNN model architecture. Sec. IV describes the
experimental setup detailing the datasets and the development
of LUCID with the hyper-parameter tuning process. In Sec.
V, LUCID is evaluated and compared with the state-of-the-art
approaches. Sec. VI introduces our kernel activation analysis
for explainability of LUCID’s classification process. Sec. VII
presents the experiment and results for the DDoS detection at
the edge. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
DDoS detection and mitigation techniques have been ex-
plored by the network research community since the first
reported DDoS attack incident in 1999 [23]. In this section, we
review and discuss anomaly-based DDoS detection techniques
categorised by statistical approaches and machine learning
approaches, with a specific focus on deep learning techniques.
A. Statistical approaches to DDoS detection
Measuring statistical properties of network traffic attributes
is a common approach to DDoS detection, and generally
involves monitoring the entropy variations of specific packet
header fields. By definition, the entropy is a measure of the
diversity or the randomness in a data set. Entropy-based DDoS
detection approaches have been proposed in the scientific
literature since the early 2000s, based on the assumption that
during a volumetric DDoS attack, the randomness of traffic
features is subject to sudden variations. The rationale is that
volumetric DDoS attacks are typically characterised by a huge
number of attackers (in the order of hundreds of thousands
[24]), often utilising compromised devices that send a high
volume of traffic to one or more end hosts (the victims). As
a result, these attacks usually cause a drop in the distribution
of some of the traffic attributes, such as the destination IP
address, or an increase in the distribution of other attributes,
such as the source IP address. The identification of a DDoS
attack is usually determined by means of thresholds on these
distribution indicators.
In one of the first published works using this approach,
Feinstein et al. [25] proposed a DDoS detection technique
based on the computation of source IP address entropy and
Chi-square distribution. The authors observed that the variation
in source IP address entropy and chi-square statistics due to
fluctuations in legitimate traffic was small, compared to the
deviations caused by DDoS attacks. Similarly, [26] combined
entropy and volume traffic characteristics to detect volumetric
DDoS attacks, while the authors of [27] proposed an entropy-
based scoring system based on the destination IP address
entropy and dynamic combinations of IP and TCP layer
attributes to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks.
A common drawback to these entropy-based techniques is
the requirement to select an appropriate detection threshold.
Given the variation in traffic type and volume across different
networks, it is a challenge to identify the appropriate detection
threshold that minimizes false positive and false negative rates
in different attack scenarios. One solution is to dynamically
adjust the thresholds to auto-adapt to the normal fluctuations
of the network traffic, as proposed in [28], [29].
Importantly, monitoring the distribution of traffic attributes
does not provide sufficient information to distinguish between
benign and malicious traffic. To address this, some approaches
apply a rudimentary threshold on the packet rate [30] or
traceback techniques [31], [32].
An alternative statistical approach is adopted in [33], where
Ahmed et al. use packet attributes and traffic flow-level statis-
tics to distinguish between benign and DDoS traffic. However,
this solution may not be suitable for online systems, since
some of the flow-level statistics used for the detection e.g. total
bytes, number of packets from source to destination and from
destination to source, and flow duration, cannot be computed
when the traffic features are collected within observation time
windows. Approaches based on flow-level statistics have also
been proposed in [34]–[39], among many others. In particular,
[36]–[39] use flow-level statistics to feed CNNs and other DL
models, as discussed in Sec. II-C. To overcome the limitations
of statistical approaches to DDoS detection, machine learning
techniques have been explored.
B. Machine Learning for DDoS detection
As identified by Sommer and Paxson in [40], there has
been extensive research on the application of machine learning
to network anomaly detection. The 2016 Buczak and Guven
survey [41] cites the use of Support Vector Machine (SVM),
k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN), Random Forest, Naı¨ve Bayes
etc. achieving success for cyber security intrusion detection.
However, due to the challenges particular to network intrusion
3detection, such as high cost of errors, variability in traffic
etc., adoption of these solutions in the “real-world” has been
limited. Over recent years, there has been a gradual increase
in availability of realistic network traffic data sets and an
increased engagement between data scientists and network
researchers to improve model explainability such that more
practical Machine Learning (ML) solutions for network attack
detection can be developed. Some of the first application
of machine learning techniques specific to DDoS detection
has been for traffic classification. Specifically, to distinguish
between benign and malicious traffic, techniques such as extra-
trees and multi-layer perceptrons have been applied [42], [43].
In consideration of the realistic operation of DDoS attacks
from virtual machines, He et al. [44] evaluate nine ML
algorithms to identify their capability to detect the DDoS from
the source side in the cloud. The results are promising with
high accuracy (99.7%) and low false positives (< 0.07%) for
the best performing algorithm; SVM linear kernel. Although
there is no information provided regarding the detection time
or the datasets used for the evaluation, the results illustrate
the variability in accuracy and performance across the range
of ML models. This is reflected across the literature e.g. [45],
[46] with the algorithm performance highly dependent on the
selected features (and datasets) evaluated. This has motivated
the consideration of deep learning for DDoS detection, which
reduces the emphasis on feature engineering.
C. Deep Learning for DDoS detection
There is a small body of work investigating the application
of DL to DDoS detection. For example, in [47], the authors
address the problem of threshold setting in entropy-based
techniques by combining entropy features with DL-based
classifiers. The evaluation demonstrates improved performance
over the threshold-based approach with higher precision and
recall. In [48], a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)-Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) is compared with a series of pre-
viously presented ML techniques (e.g. J48, Artificial Neural
Network (ANN), Random Forest, and SVM) applied to the
NSL-KDD [49] dataset. The RNN technique demonstrates a
higher accuracy and detection rate.
Some CNN-based works [36]–[39], as identified in Sec.
II-A, use flow-level statistics (total bytes, flow duration, total
number of flags, etc.) as input to the proposed DL-based
architectures. In addition, [36] and [37] combine the statistical
features with packet payloads to train the proposed IDSs.
In [19], Kehe Wu et al. present an IDS based on CNN for
multi-class traffic classification. The proposed neural network
model has been validated with flow-level features from the
NSL-KDD dataset encoded into 11x11 arrays. Evaluation
results show that the proposed model performs well compared
to complex models with 20 times more trainable parameters.
A similar approach is taken by the authors of [20], where
the CNN-based IDS is validated over datasets NSL-KDD and
UNSW-NB-15 [50]. In [51], the authors study the application
of CNNs to IDS by comparing a series of architectures (shal-
low, moderate, and deep, to reflect the number of convolution
and pooling layers) across 3 traffic datasets; NSL-KDD, Kyoto
Honeypot [52], and MAWILab [53]. In the results presented,
the shallow CNN model with a single convolution layer and
single max. pooling layer performed best. However, there is
significant variance in the detection accuracy results across the
datasets, which indicates instability in the model.
More specific to our DDoS problem, Ghanbari et al. propose
a feature extraction algorithm based on the discrete wavelet
transform and on the variance fractal dimension trajectory
to maximize the sensitivity of the CNN in detecting DDoS
attacks [5]. The evaluation results show that the proposed ap-
proach recognises DDoS attacks with 87.35% accuracy on the
CAIDA DDoS attack dataset [54]. Although the authors state
that their method allows real-time detection of DDoS attacks
in a range of environments, no performance measurements are
reported to support this claim.
DeepDefense [4] combines CNNs and RNNs to translate
original traffic traces into arrays that contain packet features
collected within sliding time windows. The results presented
demonstrate high accuracy in DDoS attack detection within
the selected ISCX2012 dataset [55]. However, it is not clear if
these results were obtained on unseen test data, or are results
from the training phase. Furthermore, the number of trainable
parameters in the model is extremely large indicating a long
and resource-intensive training phase. This would significantly
challenge implementation in an online system with constrained
resources, as will be discussed in Sec. V and VII.
Although deep learning offers the potential for an effective
DDoS detection method, as described, existing approaches
are limited by their suitability for online implementation
in resource-constrained environments. In Sec. V, we com-
pare our proposed solution, LUCID, with the state-of-the-art,
specifically [4], [35], [36], [38], [47] and demonstrate the
contributions of LUCID.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this paper we present LUCID, a CNN-based solution
for DDoS detection that can be deployed in online resource-
constrained environments. Our CNN encapsulates the learning
of malicious activity from traffic to enable the identification
of DDoS patterns regardless of their temporal positioning.
This is a fundamental benefit of CNNs; to produce the same
output regardless of where a pattern appears in the input.
This encapsulation and learning of features whilst training
the model removes the need for excessive feature engineering,
ranking and selection. To support an online attack detection
system, we use a novel preprocessing method for the network
traffic that generates a spatial data representation used as input
to the CNN. In this section, we introduce the network traffic
preprocessing method, the CNN model architecture, and the
learning procedure.
A. Network Traffic preprocessing
Network traffic is comprised of data flows between end-
points. Due to the shared nature of the communication link,
packets from different data flows are multiplexed resulting in
packets from the same flow being separated for transmission.
This means that the processing for live presentation of traffic
4TABLE I
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS.
α Learning rate n Number of packets per sample
f Number of features per packet s Batch size
h Height of convolutional filters t Time window duration
id 5-tuple flow identifier τ Time window start time
k Number of convolutional filters E Array of labelled samples
m Max pooling size L Set of labels
to a NIDS is quite different to the processing of a static dataset
comprising complete flows. For the same reason, the ability
to generate flow-level statistics, as relied upon by many of the
existing works described in Sec. II, is not feasible in an online
system.
In order to develop our online NIDS, we created a tool
that converts the traffic flows extracted from network traffic
traces of a dataset into array-like data structures and splits
them into sub-flows based on time windows. Shaping the input
as packet flows in this manner creates a spatial data repre-
sentation, which allows the CNN to learn the characteristics
of DDoS attacks and benign traffic through the convolutional
filters sliding over such input to identify salient patterns. This
form of input is compatible with traffic captured in online
deployments. The process is illustrated in Algorithm 1 and
described next. The symbols are defined in Table I.
Algorithm 1 Network traffic preprocessing algorithm
Input: Network traffic trace (NTT ), flow-level labels (L),
time window (t), max packets/sample (n)
Output: List of labelled samples (E)
1: procedure PREPROCESSING(NTT , L, t, n)
2: E ← ∅ . Initialise the set of samples
3: τ ← −1 . Initialise the time window start-time
4: for all pkt ∈ NTT do . Loop over the packets
5: id← pkt.tuple . 5-tuple flow identifier
6: if τ == −1 or pkt.time > τ + t then
7: τ ← pkt.time . Time window start time
8: end if
9: if
∣∣E [τ, id]∣∣ < n then . Max n pkts/sample
10: E [τ, id].pkts.append(pkt.features)
11: end if
12: end for
13: E ← normalization padding(E)
14: for all e ∈ E do . Labelling
15: e.label← L[e.id] . Apply the label to the sample
16: end for
17: return E
18: end procedure
Feature extraction. Given a traffic trace file from the
dataset and a pre-defined time window of length t seconds,
the algorithm collects all the packets from the file with capture
time between t0, the capture time of the first packet, and time
t0 + t. From each packet, the algorithm extracts 11 attributes
(see Table II). We intuitively exclude those attributes that
would be detrimental to the generalization of the model, such
as IP addresses and TCP/UDP ports (specific to the end-hosts
and user applications), link layer encapsulation type (linked to
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of E .
the network interfaces) and application-layer attributes (e.g.,
IRC or HTTP protocol attributes).
Data processing algorithm. This procedure, described in
Algorithm 1 at lines 4-12, simulates the traffic capturing
process of online IDSs, where the traffic is collected for a
certain amount of time t before being sent to the anomaly
detection algorithms. Hence, such algorithms must base their
decisions on portions of traffic flows, without the knowledge
of their whole life. To simulate this process, the attributes of
the packets belonging to the same bi-directional traffic flow
are grouped in chronological order to form an example of
shape [n, f ] (as shown in Table II), where f is the number
of features (11) and n is the maximum number of packets the
parsing process collects for each flow within the time window.
t and n are hyper-parameters for our CNN. Flows longer than
n are truncated, while shorter flows are zero-padded at the end
during the next stage after normalization. The same operations
are repeated for the packets within time window [t0+t, t0+2t]
and so on, until the end of the file.
Logically, we hypothesize that short time windows enable
the online systems to detect DDoS attacks within a very short
time frame. Conversely, higher values of t and n offer more
information on flows to the detection algorithms, which we
expect to result in higher detection accuracy. The sensitivity
of our CNN to the values of t and n is evaluated in Sec. IV.
The output of this process can be seen as a bi-dimensional
array of samples (E [τ, id] in Algorithm 1). A row of the
array represents the samples whose packets have been captured
in the same time window, whilst a column represents the
samples whose packets belong to the same bi-directional flow.
A graphical representation of array E is provided in Fig. 1.
Normalization and padding. Each attribute value is nor-
malized to a [0, 1] scale and the samples are zero-padded so
that each sample is of fixed length n, since having samples of
fixed length is a requirement for a CNN to be able to learn
over a full sample set. In Fig. 1, each non-empty element of
the array E is a compact graphical representation of a sample.
5TABLE II
A TCP FLOW SAMPLE BEFORE NORMALIZATION.
Pkt # Time(sec)1
Packet
Len
Highest
Layer2
IP
Flags Protocols
3 TCP
Len
TCP
Ack
TCP
Flags
TCP
Window Size
UDP
Len
ICMP
Type
Pa
ck
et
s

0 0 151 99602525 0x4000 0011010001000b 85 336 0x018 1444 0 0
1 0.092 135 99602525 0x4000 0011010001000b 69 453 0x018 510 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
j 0.513 66 78354535 0x4000 0010010001000b 0 405 0x010 1444 0 0
Pa
dd
in
g

j + 1 0 0 0 0 0000000000000b 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
n 0 0 0 0 0000000000000b 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 Relative time from the first packet of the flow.
2 Numerical representation of the highest layer recognised in the packet.
3 Binary representation of the list of protocols recognised in the packet using the well-known Bag-of-Words (BoW) model. It includes protocols from Layer 2 (arp)
to common clear text application layer protocols such as http, telnet, ftp and dns.
In each E element, coloured rows are the packets in the form
of 11 normalized attributes (i.e., the upper part of Table II),
while the white rows represent the zero-padding (i.e., the lower
part of Table II). Please note that, empty elements in Fig. 1
are for visualization only and are not included in the dataset.
An empty E [τ, id] means that no packets of flow id have been
captured in time window [τ, τ + t] (e.g. E [t0, F4]).
Labelling. Each example E [τ, id] is labelled by matching
its flow identifier id with the labels provided with the original
dataset (lines 14-16 in Algorithm 1). This also means that the
value of the label is constant along each column of array E ,
as represented in Fig. 1.
B. LUCID Model Architecture
We take the output from Algorithm 1 as input to our CNN
model for the purposes of online attack detection. LUCID
classifies traffic flows into one of two classes, either malicious
(DDoS) or benign. Our objective is to minimise the com-
plexity and performance time of this CNN model for feasible
deployment on resource-constrained devices. To achieve this,
the proposed approach is a lightweight, supervised detection
system that incorporates a CNN, similar to that of [9] from the
field of Natural Language Processing. CNNs have shared and
reused parameters with regard to the weights of the kernels,
whereas in a traditional neural network every weight is used
only once. This reduces the storage and memory requirements
of our model. The complete architecture is depicted in Fig. 2
and described in the next sections, with the hyper-parameter
tuning and ablation studies being discussed in Sec. IV.
Input layer. Recall that each traffic flow has been reshaped
into a 2-D matrix of packet features as per Sec. III-A, creating
a novel spatial representation that enables the CNN to learn
the correlation between packets of the same flow. Thus, this
first layer takes as input a traffic flow represented by a matrix
F of size n× f . F contains n individual packet vectors, such
that F = {pkt1, ... , pktn} where pktn is the nth packet in a
flow, and each packet vector has length f = 11 features.
CNN layer. As per Fig. 2, each input matrix F is operated
on by a single convolutional layer with k filters of size h× f ,
with h being the length of each filter, and again f = 11. Each
filter, also known as a kernel or sliding window, convolves
over F with a step of 1 to extract and learn local features that
contain useful information for detection of DDoS and benign
flows. Each of the k filters generates an activation map a of
size (n − h + 1), such that ak = ReLU(Conv(F )Wk, bk),
where Wk and bk are the weight and bias parameters of
the kth filter that are learned during the training stage. To
introduce non-linearity among the learned filters, we use the
rectified linear activation function ReLU(x) = max{0, x},
as per convention for CNNs. All activation maps are stacked,
creating an activation matrix A of size (n− h+ 1)× k, such
that A = [a1|...|ak].
There are two main benefits of including a CNN in our
architecture. Firstly, it allows the model to benefit from
efficiency gains compared to standard neural networks, since
the weights in each filter are reused across the whole input.
Sharing weights, instead of the full end-to-end connectivity
with a standard neural net, makes the model more lightweight
and reduces its memory footprint as the number of learnable
parameters is greatly reduced. Secondly, during the training
phase, the CNN automatically learns the weights and biases
of each filter such that the learning of salient characteristics
and features is encapsulated inside the resulting model during
training. This reduces the time-consuming feature engineering
and ranking involved in statistical and traditional machine
learning methods, which relies on expert human knowledge.
As a result, this model is more adaptable to new subtleties of
DDoS attack, since the training stage can be simply repeated
anytime with fresh training data without having to craft and
rank new features.
Max pooling layer. For max pooling, we down-sample
along the first dimension of A, which represents the temporal
nature of the input. A pool size of m produces an output
matrix mo of size ((n − h + 1)/m) × k, which contains the
largest m activations of each learned filter, such that mo =
[max(a1)|...|max(ak)]. In this way, the model disregards
the less useful information that produced smaller activations,
instead paying attention to the larger activations. This also
means that we dispose of the positional information of the
activation, i.e. where it occurred in the original flow, giving a
more compressed feature encoding, and, in turn, reducing the
complexity of the network. mo is then flattened to produce
6Fig. 2. LUCID architecture.
the final one-dimensional feature vector v to be input to the
classification layer.
Classification layer. v is input to a fully-connected layer
of the same size, and the output layer has a sole node. This
output x is passed to the sigmoid activation function such that
σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x). This constrains the activation to a value
of between 0 and 1, hence returning the probability p ∈ [0, 1]
of a given flow being a malicious DDoS attack. The flow is
classified as DDoS when p > 0.5, and benign otherwise.
C. The Learning Procedure
When training LUCID, the objective is to minimise its cost
function through iteratively updating all the weights and biases
contained within the model. These weights and biases are also
known as trainable, or learnable, parameters. The cost function
calculates the cost, also called the error or the loss, between the
model’s prediction, and the ground truth of the input. Hence by
minimising this cost function, we reduce the prediction error.
At each iteration in training, the input data is fed forward
through the network, the error calculated, and then this error
is back-propagated through the network. This continues until
convergence is reached, when further updates don’t reduce
the error any further, or the training process reaches the set
maximum number of epochs. With two classes in our problem
the binary cross-entropy cost function is used. Formally this
cost function c that calculates the error over a batch of s
samples can be written as:
c = −1
s
s∑
j=1
(yj log pj + (1− yj) log(1− pj)) (1)
where yj is the ground truth target label for each flow j in
the batch of s samples, and pj is the predicted probability flow
j is malicious DDoS. This is supervised learning because each
flow in our datasets is labelled with the ground truth, either
DDoS or benign. To reduce bias in our learning procedure, we
ensure that these datasets are balanced with equal numbers of
malicious and benign flows, which gives a greater degree of
confidence that the model is learning the correct feature repre-
sentations from the patterns in the traffic flows. As previously
highlighted, the learning is encapsulated inside the model by
all the weights and biases, meaning that our approach does
not require significant expert input to craft bespoke features
and statistically assess their importance during preprocessing,
unlike many existing methods, as outlined in Sec. II.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Datasets
Our CNN model is validated with recent datasets ISCX2012
[55], CIC2017 [56] and CSECIC2018 [57] provided by the
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity of the University of
New Brunswick (UNB), Canada. They consist of several
days of network activity, normal and malicious, including
DDoS attacks. The three datasets are publicly available in
the form of traffic traces in pcap format including full packet
payloads, plus supplementary text files containing the labels
and statistical details for each traffic flow.
The UNB researchers have generated these datasets by
using profiles to accurately represent the abstract properties
of human and attack behaviours. One profile characterises the
normal network activities and provides distribution models for
applications and protocols (HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3,
and FTP) produced with the analysis of real traffic traces.
Other profiles describe a variety of attack scenarios based on
recent security reports. They are used to mimic the behaviour
of the malicious attackers by means of custom botnets and
well-known DDoS attacking tools such as High Orbit Ion
Cannon (HOIC) [58] and its predecessor, the Low Orbit Ion
Cannon (LOIC) [59]. HOIC and LOIC have been widely
used by Anonymous and other hacker groups in some highly-
publicized attacks against PayPal, Mastercard, Visa, Amazon,
Megaupload, among others [60].
Table III shows the parts of the three datasets used in this
work. In the table, the column Traffic trace specifies the name
of the trace, according to [55], [56] and [57]. Specifically,
the ISCX2012-Tue15 trace contains a DDoS attack based
on an IRC botnet. The CIC2017-Fri7PM trace contains a
HTTP DDoS generated with LOIC, while the CSECIC2018-
Wed21 trace contains a HTTP DDoS generated with HOIC.
With respect to the original file, the trace CIC2017-Fri7PM
is reduced to timeslot 3.30PM-5.00PM to exclude malicious
packets related to other cyber attacks (port scans and back-
doors).
TABLE III
THE DATASETS FROM UNB [61].
Dataset Traffic trace #Flows #Benign #DDoS
ISCX2012 Tue15 571698 534320 37378
CIC2017 Fri7PM 225745 97718 128027
CSECIC2018 Wed21 1048575 360832 687743
In an initial design, the model was trained and validated
on the ISCX2012 dataset producing high accuracy results.
However, testing the model on the CIC2017 dataset confirmed
the generally held observation that a model trained on one
dataset will not necessarily perform well on a completely
new dataset. In particular, we obtained a false negative rate
of about 17%. This can be attributed to the different attacks
7represented in the two datasets, as previously described. What
we attempt in this work is to develop a model that when trained
and validated across a mixed dataset can reproduce the high
performance results on completely unseen test data. To achieve
this, a combined training dataset is generated as described in
Sec. IV-B.
B. Data preparation
We extract the 37378 DDoS flows from ISCX2012,
plus randomly select 37378 benign flows from the
same year to balance. We repeat this process with
97718/97718 benign/DDoS flows for CIC2017 and again with
360832/360832 benign/DDoS flows for CSECIC2018.
After the pre-preprocessing stage, where flows are translated
into array-like data structures (Sec. III-A), each of the three
datasets is split into training (90%) and test (10%) sets, with
10% of the training set used for validation. Please note that, the
split operation is performed on a per-flow basis to ensure that
samples obtained from the same traffic flow end up in the same
split, hence avoiding the “contamination” of the validation and
test splits with data used for the training. We finally combine
the training splits from each year by balancing them with
equal proportions from each year to produce a single training
set. We do the same with the validation and test splits, to
obtain a final dataset referred to as UNB201X in the rest of
the paper. UNB201X training and validation sets are only used
for training the model and tuning the hyper-parameters (Sec.
IV-D), while the test set is used for the evaluation presented
in Sec. V and VII, either as a whole combined test set, or as
individual per-year test sets for state-of-the-art comparison.
A summary of the final UNB201X splits is presented in
Table IV, which reports the number of samples as a function of
time window duration t. As illustrated in Table IV, low values
of this hyper-parameter yield larger numbers of samples.
Intuitively, using short time windows leads to splitting traffic
flows into many small fragments (ultimately converted into
samples), while long time windows produce the opposite
result. In contrast, the value of n has a negligible impact on
the final number of samples in the dataset.
TABLE IV
UNB201X DATASET SPLITS.
Time
Window
Total
Samples Training Validation Test
t=1s 480519 389190 43272 48057
t=2s 353058 285963 31782 35313
t=3s 310590 251574 27957 31059
t=4s 289437 234438 26055 28944
t=5s 276024 223569 24852 27603
t=10s 265902 215379 23931 26592
t=20s 235593 190827 21204 23562
t=50s 227214 184041 20451 22722
t=100s 224154 181551 20187 22416
C. Evaluation methodology
As per convention in the literature, we report the metrics
Accuracy (ACC), False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision (or
Positive Predictive Value (PPV)), Recall (or True Positive Rate
(TPR)) and F1 Score (F1), with a focus on the latter. Accuracy
is the percentage of correctly classified samples (both benign
and DDoS). FPR represents the percentage of samples that
are falsely classified as DDoS. PPV is the ratio between the
correctly detected DDoS samples and all the detected DDoS
samples (true and false). TPR represents the percentage of
DDoS samples that are correctly classified as such. The F1
Score is an overall measure of a model’s performance; that is
the harmonic mean of the PPV and TPR. These metrics are
formally defined as follows:
ACC = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN FPR =
FP
FP+TN
PPV = TPTP+FP TPR =
TP
TP+FN F1 = 2 · PPV ·TPRPPV+TPR
where TP=True Positives, TN=True Negatives, FP=False Pos-
itives, FN=False Negatives.
The output of the training process is a combination of
trainable and hyper parameters that maximizes the F1 Score
on the validation set or, in other words, that minimizes the
total number of False Positives and False Negatives.
Model training and validation have been performed on a
server-class computer equipped with two 16-core Intel Xeon
Silver 4110 @2.1 GHz CPUs and 64 GB of RAM. The models
have been implemented in Python v3.6 using the Keras API
v2.2.4 [62] on top of Tensorflow 1.13.1 [63].
D. Hyper-parameter tuning
Tuning the hyper-parameters is an important step to opti-
mise the model’s accuracy, as their values influence the model
complexity and the learning process. Prior to our experiments,
we empirically chose the hyper-parameter values based on the
results of preliminary tuning and on the motivations described
per parameter. We then adopted a grid search strategy to
explore the set of hyper-parameters using F1 score as the
performance metric. At each point in the grid, the training
continues indefinitely and stops when the loss does not de-
crease for a consecutive 25 times. Then, the search process
saves the F1 score and moves to the next point.
As per Sec. IV-B, UNB201X is split into training, validation
and testing sets. For hyper-parameter tuning, we use only the
validation set. It is important to highlight that we do not tune to
the test set, as that may artificially improve performance. The
test set is kept completely unseen, solely for use in generating
our experimental results, which are reported in Sec. V.
Maximum number of packets/sample. n is important
for the characterization of the traffic and for capturing the
temporal patterns of traffic flows. The value of n indicates
the maximum number of packets of a flow recorded in
chronological order in a sample.
The resulting set of packets describes a portion of the life
of the flow in a given time window, including the (relative)
time information of packets. Repetition-based DDoS attacks
use a small set of messages at approximately constant rates,
therefore a small value of n is sufficient to spot the temporal
patterns among the packet features, hence requiring a limited
number of trainable parameters. On the other hand, more
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity of our model to hyper-parameter n.
complex attacks, such as the ones performed with the HOIC
tool, which uses multiple HTTP headers to make the requests
appear legitimate, might require a larger number of packets to
achieve the desired degree of accuracy. Given the variety of
DDoS tools used to simulate the attack traffic in the dataset
(IRC-based bot, LOIC and HOIC), we experimented with n
ranging between 1 and 100, and we compared the performance
in terms of F1 score. The results are provided in Fig. 3 for
different durations of time window t, but at fixed values of
the other hyper-parameters for the sake of visualisation.
The F1 score steadily increases with the value of n when
n < 5, and then stabilises when n ≥ 5. However, an increase
in F1 score is still observed up to n = 100. Although, a
low value of n can be used to speed up the detection time
(less convolutions) and to reduce the requirements in terms of
storage and RAM (smaller sample size), which links to our
objective of a lightweight implementation, we wish to balance
high accuracy with low resource consumption. This will be
demonstrated in Sec. VII.
Time Window. The time window t is used to simulate
the capturing process of online systems (see Sec. III-A). We
evaluated the F1 score for time windows ranging between 1
and 100 seconds (as in the related work e.g. [4]) at different
values of n. The results are shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Sensitivity of our model to hyper-parameter t.
Although the number of samples in the training set de-
creases when t increases (see Table IV), the CNN is relatively
insensitive to this hyper-parameter for n > 1. With n = 1,
the traffic flows are represented by samples of shape [1, f ],
i.e. only one packet/sample, irrespective of the duration of the
time window. In such a corner case, since the CNN cannot
correlate the attributes of different packets within the same
sample, the F1 score is more influenced by the number of
samples in the training set (the more samples, the better).
Height of convolutional filters. h determines the height of
the filters (the width is fixed to 11, the number of features),
i.e. the number of packets to involve in each matrix operation.
Testing with h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, we observed a small, but
noticeable, difference in the F1 score between h = 1 (0.9934)
and h = 3 (0.9950), with no major improvement beyond
h = 3.
Number of convolutional filters. As per common practice,
we experimented by increasing the number of convolutional
filters k by powers of 2, from k = 1 to k = 64. We observed
a steady increase in the F1 score with the value of k, which
is a direct consequence of the increasing number of trainable
parameters in the model.
Resulting hyper-parameter set. After conducting a com-
prehensive grid search on 2835 combinations of hyper-
parameters, we have selected the CNN model configuration
that maximises the F1 score on the UNB201X validation set
(Table V). That is:
n = 100, t = 100, k = 64, h = 3, m = 98
The resulting model, trained with batch size s = 2048 and
using the Adam optimizer [64] with learning rate α = 0.01,
consists of 2241 trainable parameters, 2176 for the convolu-
tional layer (h · f units for each filter plus bias, multiplied by
the number of filters K) and 65 for the fully connected layer
(64 units plus bias).
As previously noted, other configurations may present lower
resource requirements at the cost of a minimal decrease in F1
score. For example, using k = 32 would reduce the number of
convolutions by half, while n = 10, 20, 50 would also require
fewer convolutions and a smaller memory footprint. However,
setting n = 100 not only maximises the F1 score, but also
enables a fair comparison with state-of-the-art approaches such
as DeepDefense [4] (Sec. V), where the authors trained their
neural networks using n = 100 (in [4], the hyper-parameter is
denoted as T ). Furthermore, the chosen configuration enables
a worst-case analysis for resource-constrained scenarios such
as that presented in Sec. VII.
These hyper-parameters are kept constant throughout our
experiments presented in Sec. V and VII.
TABLE V
SCORES OBTAINED ON THE UNB201X VALIDATION SET.
Validation set ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
UNB201X 0.9950 0.0083 0.9917 0.9983 0.9950
V. RESULTS
In this section, we present a detailed evaluation of the
proposed approach with the datasets presented in Sec. IV-A.
Evaluation metrics of Accuracy (ACC), False Positive Rate
(FPR), Precision (PPV), Recall (TPR) and F1 Score (F1) have
been used for performance measurement and for comparison
with state-of-the-art models.
9A. Detection accuracy
In order to validate our approach and the results obtained on
the validation dataset, we measure the performance of LUCID
in classifying unseen traffic flows as benign or malicious
(DDoS). Table VI summarizes the results obtained on the
various test sets produced through the procedure described
in Sec. IV-B. As illustrated, the very high performance is
maintained across the range of test datasets indicating the
robustness of the LUCID design. These results are further
discussed in Sec. V-B, where we compare our solution with
state-of-the-art works reported in the scientific literature.
TABLE VI
LUCID DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON THE TEST SETS.
Test set ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
ISCX2012 0.9888 0.0179 0.9827 0.9952 0.9889
CIC2017 0.9967 0.0059 0.9939 0.9994 0.9966
CSECIC2018 0.9987 0.0016 0.9984 0.9989 0.9987
UNB201X 0.9946 0.0087 0.9914 0.9979 0.9946
The results show that thanks to the properties of its CNN,
LUCID learns to distinguish between patterns of malicious
DDoS behaviour and benign flows. Given the properties of
convolutional methods, these patterns are recognised regard-
less of the position they occupy in a flow, demonstrating that
our spatial representation of a flow is robust. Irrespective of
whether the DDoS event appears at the start or the end of
the input, LUCID will produce the same representation in
its output. Although the temporal dynamics in DDoS attacks
might suggest that alternative DL architectures may seem more
suitable (e.g. Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)), our novel
preprocessing method combined with the CNN removes the
requirement for the model to maintain temporal context of
each whole flow as the data is pushed through the network.
In comparison, LSTMs are known to be very difficult to train,
and their performance is inherently slower for long sequences
compared to CNNs.
B. State-Of-The-Art Comparison
For a fair comparison between LUCID and the state-of-the-
art, we focus our analysis on solutions that have validated the
UNB datasets for DDoS attack detection.
We have paid particular attention to DeepDefense [4] as,
similar to our approach, the model is trained with packet
attributes rather than flow-level statistics used in other works.
DeepDefense translates the pcap files of ISCX2012 into arrays
that contain packet attributes collected within sliding time
windows. The label assigned to a sample is the label of the last
packet in the time window, according to the labels provided
with the original dataset. The proposed data preprocessing
technique is similar to LUCID’s. However, in LUCID, a sample
corresponds to a single traffic flow, whereas in DeepDefense
a sample represents the traffic collected in a time window.
Of the four DL models presented in the DeepDefense
paper, the one called 3LSTM produces the highest scores in
the classification of DDoS traffic. Therefore, we have imple-
mented 3LSTM for comparison purposes. The architecture
of this model includes 6 LSTM layers of 64 neurons each,
2 fully connected layers of 128 neurons each, and 4 batch
normalization layers. To directly compare the DL models,
we have trained 3LSTM on the UNB201X training set with
n = 100 and t = 100 as done with LUCID. We have compared
our implementation of 3LSTM with LUCID on each of the four
test sets, and present the F1 score results in Table VII.
TABLE VII
LUCID-DEEPDEFENSE COMPARISON (F1 SCORE).
Model TrainableParameters
ISCX
2012
CIC
2017
CSECIC
2018
UNB
201X
LUCID 2241 0.9889 0.9966 0.9987 0.9946
3LSTM 1004889 0.9880 0.9968 0.9987 0.9943
The results presented in Table VII show that LUCID and
3LSTM are comparable in terms of F1 score across the
range of test datasets. However, in terms of computation time,
LUCID outperforms 3LSTM in detection time. Specifically,
as measured on the Intel Xeon server in these experiments,
LUCID can classify more than 55000 samples/sec on average,
while 3LSTM barely reaches 1300 samples/sec on average
(i.e., more than 40 times slower). Indeed, LUCID’s limited
number of hidden units and trainable parameters contribute to
a much lower computational complexity compared to 3LSTM.
As previously noted, there are a number of solutions in the
literature that present performance results for the ISCX2012
and CIC2017 datasets. Notably, these works do not all specify
whether the results presented are based on a validation dataset
or a test dataset. For LUCID, we reiterate that the results
presented in this section are based on a test set of completely
unseen data.
TABLE VIII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART APPROACHES
USING THE ISCX2012 DATASET FOR DDOS DETECTION.
Model ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
LUCID 0.9888 0.0179 0.9827 0.9952 0.9889
DeepDefense
3LSTM [4] 0.9841 N/A 0.9834 0.9847 0.9840
TR-IDS [36] 0.9809 0.0040 N/A 0.9593 N/A
E3ML [47] N/A N/A N/A 0.9474 N/A
In Table VIII, we compare the performance of LUCID
against state-of-the-art works validated on ISCX2012. Table
VIII also includes the performance of 3LSTM as reported in
the DeepDefense paper [4]. With respect to our version of
3LSTM, the scores are slightly lower, which we propose is
due to the different pcap preprocessing mechanisms used in
the two implementations. This indicates a performance benefit
when using the LUCID preprocessing mechanism.
TR-IDS [36] is an IDS which adopts a text-CNN [9] to
extract features from the payload of the network traffic. These
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features, along with a combination of 25 packet and flow-
level attributes, are used for traffic classification by means of
a Random Forest algorithm. Accuracy and TPR of TR-IDS are
above 0.99 for all the attack profiles available in ISCX2012
except the DDoS attack, for which the performance results are
noticeably lower than LUCID.
E3ML [47] uses 20 entropy-based traffic features and three
ML classifiers (a RNN, a Multilayer Perceptron and an Al-
ternating Decision Tree) to classify the traffic as normal or
DDoS. Despite the complex architecture, the TPR measured
on ISCX2012 shows that E3ML is inclined to false negatives.
For the CIC2017 dataset, we present the performance com-
parison with state-of-the-art solutions in Table IX.
TABLE IX
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART APPROACHES
USING THE CIC2017 DATASET FOR DDOS DETECTION.
Model ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
LUCID 0.9967 0.0059 0.9939 0.9994 0.9966
DeepGFL [35] N/A N/A 0.7567 0.3024 0.4321
MLP [38] 0.8634 N/A 0.8847 0.8625 0.8735
1D-CNN [38] 0.9514 N/A 0.9814 0.9017 0.9399
LSTM [38] 0.9624 N/A 0.9844 0.8989 0.8959
1D-CNN +
LSTM [38] 0.9716 N/A 0.9741 0.9910 0.9825
DeepGFL [35] is a framework designed to extract high-
order traffic features from low-order features forming a hier-
archical graph representation. To validate the proposed frame-
work, the authors used the graph representation of the features
to train two traffic classifiers, namely Decision Tree and
Random Forest, and tested them on CIC2017. Although the
precision scores on the several attack types are reasonably
good (between 0.88 and 1 on any type of traffic profile except
DDoS), the results presented in the paper reveal that the
proposed approach is prone to false negatives, leading to very
low F1 scores.
The authors of [38] propose four different DL models for
DDoS attack detection in Internet of Things (IoT) networks.
The models are built with combinations of LSTM, CNN and
fully connected layers. The input layer of all the models
consists of 82 units, one for each flow-level feature available
in CIC2017, while the output layer returns the probability of
a given flow being part of a DDoS attack. The model 1D-
CNN+LSTM produces good classification scores, while the
others seem to suffer from high false negatives rates.
To the best of our knowledge, no DDoS attack detection
solutions validated on the CSECIC2018 dataset are available
yet in the scientific literature.
C. Discussion
From the results presented and analysed in the previous
sections, we can conclude that using packet-level attributes
of network traffic is more effective, and results in higher clas-
sification accuracy, than using flow-level features or statistic
information such as the entropy measure. This is not only
proved by the evaluation results obtained with LUCID and
our implementation of DeepDefense (both based on packet-
level attributes), but also by the high classification accuracy
of TR-IDS, which combines flow-level features with packet
attributes, including part of the payload.
In contrast, E3ML, DeepGFL and most of the solutions
proposed in [38], which all rely on flow-level features, seem
to be more prone to false negatives, and hence to classify
DDoS attacks as normal activity. The only exception is the
model 1D-CNN+LSTM of [38], which produces a high TPR
by combining CNN and RNN layers.
Furthermore, we highlight that LUCID has not been tuned
to the individual datasets but rather to the validation portion of
a combined dataset, and still outperforms the state-of-the-art
on totally unseen test data.
VI. ANALYSIS
We now present interpretation and explanation of the inter-
nal operations of LUCID by way of proving that the model
is learning the correct domain information. We do this by
analysing the features used in the dataset and their activations
in the model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
application of a specific activation analysis to a CNN-based
DDoS detection method.
A. Kernel activations
This approach is inspired by a similar study [65] to interpret
CNNs in the rather different domain of natural language
processing. However, the kernel activation analysis technique
is transferable to our work. As each kernel has the same width
as the input matrix, it is possible to remove the classifier,
push the DDoS flows through the convolutional layer and
capture the resulting activations per kernel. For each flow,
we calculate the total activations per feature, which in the
spatial input representation means per column, resulting in
11 values that map to the 11 features. This is then repeated
for all kernels, across all DDoS flows, with the final output
being the total column-wise activation of each feature. The
intuition is that the higher a feature’s activation when a
positive sample i.e. a DDoS flow is seen, the more importance
the CNN attaches to that particular feature. Conversely, the
lower the activation, the lower the importance of the feature,
and since our model uses the conventional rectified linear
activation function, ReLU(x) = max{0, x}, this means that
any negative activations become zero and hence have no
impact on the Sigmoid classifier for detecting a DDoS attack.
Summing these activations over all kernels is possible
since they are of the same size and operate over the same
spatial representations. We analyse DDoS flows from the same
UNB201X test set used in Sec. V-A.
Table X presents the ranking of the 11 features based on
the post-ReLU average column-wise feature activation sums,
and highlights two features that activate our CNN the most,
across all of its kernels.
Highest Layer. We assert that the CNN may be learning
from the highest layer at which each DDoS flow operates.
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TABLE X
RANKING OF THE TOTAL COLUMN-WISE FEATURE KERNEL ACTIVATIONS
FOR THE UNB201X DATASET
Feature Total KernelActivation Feature
Total Kernel
Activation
Highest Layer 0.69540 Time 0.11108
IP Flags 0.30337 TCP Win Size 0.09596
TCP Flags 0.19693 TCP Ack 0.00061
TCP Len 0.16874 UDP Len 0.00000
Protocols 0.14897 ICMP Type 0.00000
Pkt Len 0.14392
Recall that highest layer links to the type of DDoS attack e.g.
network, transport, or application layer attack. We propose that
this information could be used to extend LUCID to predict
the specific type of DDoS attack taking place, and there-
fore, to contribute to selection of the appropriate protection
mechanism. We would achieve the prediction by extending
the dataset labeling, which we consider for future work.
IP Flags. In our design, this attribute is a 16-bit integer
value which includes three bits representing the flags Reserved
Bit, Don’t Fragment and More Fragments, plus 13 bits for the
Fragment offset value, which is non-zero only if bit “Don’t
Fragment” is unset. Unlike the IP fragmented flood DDoS
attacks, in which the IP flags are manipulated to exploit
the datagram fragmentation mechanisms, 99.99% of DDoS
packets in the UNB datasets present an IP flags value of
0x4000, with only the “Don’t Fragment” bit set to 1. A
different distribution of IP flags is observed in the UNB
benign traffic, with the “Don’t Fragment” bit set to 1 in
about 92% of the packets. Thus, the pattern of IP flags is
slightly different between attack and benign traffic, and we
are confident that LUCID is indeed learning their significance
in DDoS classification, as evidenced by its 2nd place in our
ranking.
B. Future Directions
However, even given this activation analysis, there is no
definitive list of features that exist for detecting DDoS attacks
with which we can directly compare our results. Analysing
the related work, we identify a wide range of both stateless
and stateful features highlighted for their influence in a given
detection model, which is not unexpected as the features of
use vary depending on the attack traffic. This is highlighted by
the 2014 study [66], which concludes that different classes of
attack have different properties, leading to the wide variance
in features identified as salient for the attack detection. The
authors also observe that the learning of patterns specific to
the attack scenario would be more valuable than an effort to
produce an attack-agnostic finite list of features. We, therefore,
conclude from our analysis that LUCID appears to be learning
the importance of relevant features for DDoS detection, which
gives us confidence in the prediction performance.
Linked to this activation analysis, we highlight adversarial
robustness as a key consideration for the deployment of ML-
based IDSs. As detailed in [67], the two main attacks on IDSs
are during training via a poisoning attack (i.e. corruption of the
training data), or in testing, when an evasion attack attempts
to cause incorrect classification by making small perturbations
to observed features. Our activation analysis is a first step in
the investigation of the model behaviour in adversarial cases
with the feature ranking in Table X highlighting the features
for perturbation for evasion attacks. Of course, the adversary
model (goal, knowledge, and capability) dictates the potential
for a successful attack. For example, the attacker would require
full knowledge of the CNN and kernel activations, and have
the ability to forge traffic within the network. The construction
of defences robust to adversarial attacks is an open problem
[68] and an aspect which we will further explore for LUCID.
VII. USE-CASE: DDOS DETECTION AT THE EDGE
Edge computing is an emerging paradigm adopted in a
variety of contexts (e.g. fog computing [69], edge clouds
[70]), with the aim of improving the performance of applica-
tions with low-latency and high-bandwidth requirements. Edge
computing complements centralised data centres with a large
number of distributed nodes that provide computation services
close to the sources of the data.
The proliferation of attacks leveraging unsecured IoT de-
vices (e.g., the Mirai botnet [71] and its variants) demonstrate
the potential value in edge-based DDoS attack detection.
Indeed, with edge nodes close to the IoT infrastructure, they
can detect and block the DDoS traffic as soon as it leaves
the compromised devices. However, in contrast to cloud high-
performance servers, edge nodes cannot exploit sophisticated
solutions against DDoS attacks, due to their limited computing
and memory resources. Although recent research efforts have
demonstrated that the mitigation of DDoS attacks is feasible
even by means of commodity computers [72], [73], edge
computing-based DDoS detection is still at an early stage.
In this section, we demonstrate that our DDoS detection
solution can be deployed and effectively executed on resource-
constrained devices, such as edge nodes or IoT gateways, by
running LUCID on an NVIDIA Jetson TX2 development board
[74], equipped with a quad-core ARM Cortex-A57@2 GHz
CPU, 8 GB of RAM and a 256-core Pascal@1300 MHz
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). For the experiments, we
used Tensorflow 1.9.0 with GPU support enabled by cuDNN,
a GPU-accelerated library for deep neural networks [75].
A. Detection
In the first experiment, we analyse the applicability of
our approach to online edge computing environments by
estimating the prediction performance in terms of samples
processed per second. As we are aware that edge nodes do not
necessarily mount a GPU device, we conduct the experiments
with and without the GPU support on the UNB201X test set
and discuss the results.
We note that in an online system, our preprocessing tool pre-
sented in Section III-A can be integrated into the server/edge
device. The tool would process the live traffic collected from
the NICs of the server/edge device, collecting the packet
attributes, organising them into flows and, after a predefined
time interval, T , pass the data structure to the CNN for
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inference. We acknowledge that the speed of this process will
influence the overall system performance. However, as we
have not focused on optimising our preprocessing tool, rather
on optimising detection, its evaluation is left as future work.
Instead, in these experiments, we load the UNB datasets from
the hard disk rather than processing live traffic.
With respect to this, one relevant parameter is the batch
size, which configures how many samples are processed by the
CNN in parallel at each iteration. Such a parameter influences
the speed of the detection, as it determines the number of
iterations and, as a consequence, the number of memory reads
required by the CNN to process all the samples in the test set
(or the samples collected in a time window, in the case of
online detection).
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Fig. 5. Inference performance on the NVIDIA Jetson TX2 board.
Fig. 5 shows the performance of LUCID on the development
board in terms of processed samples/second. As the shape
of each sample is [n, f ] = [100, 11], i.e. each sample can
contain the features of up to 100 packets, we can estimate
that the maximum number of packets per second (pps) that the
device can process without the GPU and using a batch size
of 1024 samples is approximately 1.9 Mpps. As an example,
the content of the UNB201X test set is 602,547 packets
distributed over 22,416 samples, which represents a processing
requirement of 500 Kpps without the GPU, and 600 Kpps when
the GPU is enabled. This illustrates the ability to deploy
LUCID on a resource-constrained platform.
The second measurement regarding resource-constrained
systems is the memory requirement to store all the samples
collected over a time window. The memory occupancy per
sample is 8,800 bytes, i.e. 100·11 = 1100 floating point values
of 8 bytes each. As per Fig. 5, the CNN can process around
23K samples/second with the help of the GPU and using a
batch size of 1024. To cope with such a processing speed,
the device would require approximately 20 GB RAM for a
t = 100 time window. However, this value greatly exceeds the
typical amount of memory available on edge nodes, in general
(e.g., 1 GB on Raspberry Pi 3 [76], 2 GB on the ODROID-
XU board [77]), and on our device, in particular. Indeed, the
memory resources of nodes can represent the real bottleneck
in an edge computing scenario.
Therefore, assuming that our edge node is equipped with
1 GB RAM, the maximum number of samples that can be
stored in RAM is approximately 100K (without taking into
account RAM used by the operating system and applications).
We have calculated that this memory size would be sufficient
for an attack such as the HTTP-based DDoS attack in the
CSECIC2018 dataset, for which we measured approximately
30K samples on average over a 100 s time window. For
more aggressive attacks, however, a strategy to overcome the
memory limitation would be to configure the CNN model with
lower values of t and n. For instance, setting the value of both
parameters to 10 can reduce the memory requirement by a
factor of 100, with a low cost in detection accuracy (F1 score
0.9928 on the UNB201X test set, compared to the highest
score obtained with t = n = 100, i.e. 0.9946). The dynamic
configuration of the model itself is out of scope of this work.
The measurements based on our test datasets demonstrate
that the LUCID CNN is usable on a resource-constrained
platform both with respect to processing and memory require-
ments. These results are promising for effective deployment
of LUCID in a variety of edge computing scenarios, including
those where the nodes execute latency-sensitive services. A
major challenge in this regard is balancing between resource
usage of LUCID (including traffic collection and preprocess-
ing) and detection accuracy, i.e. ensuring the required level of
protection against DDoS attacks without causing delays to the
services. A deep study of this trade-off is out of scope of this
paper and is reserved for future work.
B. Training time
In a real-world scenario, the CNN model will require re-
training with new samples of benign and malicious traffic
to update all the weights and biases. In edge computing
environments, the traditional approach is to send large amounts
of data from edge nodes to remote facilities such as private
or commercial datacentres. However, this can result in high
end-to-end latency and bandwidth usage. In addition, it may
raise security concerns, as it requires trust in a third-party
entity (in the case of commercial cloud services) regarding
the preservation of data confidentiality and integrity.
A solution to this issue is to execute the re-training task
locally on the edge nodes. In this case, the main challenge is
to control the total training time, as this time determines how
long the node remains exposed to new DDoS attacks before
the detection model can leverage the updated parameters.
To demonstrate the suitability of our model for this situation,
we have measured the convergence training time of LUCID
on the development board using the UNB201X training and
validation sets with and without the GPU support. We have
experimented by following the learning procedure described
in Sec. III-C, thus with a training termination criterion based
on the loss value measured on the validation set. The results
are presented in Table XI along with the performance obtained
on the server used for the study in Sec. IV-D.
As shown in Table XI, the CNN training time on the
development board without using the GPU is around 2 hours
(184 epochs). This is approximately 4 times slower than
training on the server, but clearly outperforms the training time
of our implementation of DeepDefense 3LSTM, which we
measured at more than 1000 sec/epoch with the GPU (i.e., 40
times slower than LUCID under the same testing conditions).
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TABLE XI
TRAINING CONVERGENCE TIME.
Setup Time/epoch(sec)
Convergence
time (sec)
LUCID Server 10.2 1880
LUCID Dev. board (GPU) 25.8 4500
LUCID Dev. board (CPU) 40.5 7450
3LSTM Dev. board (GPU) 1070 >90000
In application scenarios where a faster convergence is
required, the time can be further reduced by either terminating
the training process early after a pre-defined number of epochs,
or limiting the size of the training/validation sets. As adopting
one or both of such strategies can result in a lower detection
accuracy, the challenge in such scenarios is finding the trade-
off between convergence time and detection accuracy that
meets the application requirements.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The challenge of DDoS attacks continues to undermine the
availability of networks globally. In this work, we have pre-
sented a CNN-based DDoS detection architecture. Our design
has targeted a practical, lightweight implementation with low
processing overhead and attack detection time. The benefit
of the CNN model is to remove threshold configuration as
required by statistical detection approaches, and reduce feature
engineering and the reliance on human experts required by
alternative ML techniques. This enables practical deployment.
In contrast to existing solutions, our unique traffic pre-
processing mechanism acknowledges how traffic flows across
network devices and is designed to present network traffic
to the CNN model for online DDoS attack detection. Our
evaluation results demonstrate that LUCID matches the existing
state-of-the-art performance. However, distinct from existing
work, we demonstrate consistent detection results across a
range of datasets, demonstrating the stability of our solution.
Furthermore, our evaluation on a resource-constrained device
demonstrates the suitability of our model for deployment in
resource-constrained environments. Specifically, we demon-
strate a 40x improvement in processing time over similar
state-of-the-art solutions. Finally, we have also presented an
activation analysis to explain how LUCID learns to detect
DDoS traffic, which is lacking in existing works.
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